<OT> New Posting: ROA-1056

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ROA 1056-1109

An Epistemic Interpretation of Bidirectional Optimality Based on Signaling Games

Michael Franke <m.franke at uva.nl>

Direct link: http://roa.rutgers.edu/view.php3?roa=1056


Abstract:
To some, the relation between bidirectional optimality theory
and game theory seems obvious: strong bidirectional optimality
corresponds to Nash equilibrium in a strategic game (Dekker
and van Rooij 2000). But in the domain of pragmatics this
formally sound parallel is conceptually inadequate: the
sequence of utterance and its interpretation cannot be modelled
reasonably as a strategic game, because this would mean
that speakers choose formulations independently of a meaning
that they want to express, and that hearers choose an interpretat
ion irrespective of an utterance that they have observed.
Clearly, the sequence of utterance and interpretation requires
a dynamic game model. One such model, and one that is widely
studied and of manageable complexity, is a signaling game.
This paper is therefore concerned with an epistemic interpretatio
n of bidirectional optimality, both strong and weak, in
terms of beliefs and strategies of players in a signaling
game. In particular, I suggest that strong optimality may
be regarded as a process of internal self-monitoring and
that weak optimality corresponds to an iterated process
of such selfmonitoring. This latter process can be derived
by assuming that agents act rationally to (possibly partial)
beliefs in a self-monitoring opponent.

Comments: In: ZAS Papers in Linguistics, 51, 111-134, 2009.
Keywords: bidirectional optimality, game theory, signaling games, rationality
Areas: Formal Analysis
Type: Journal Article

Direct link: http://roa.rutgers.edu/view.php3?roa=1056